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PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS BY PUBLIC OFFICERS AS
INFRINGEMENTS OF DISCHARGED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
LIBERTY INTERESTS
Colaizzi v. Walker
542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976)
As early as 1399,1 the English courts recognized a rule of privilege in
favor of certain public officers, shielding them from suit for statements
made in connection with the performance of their official duties. 2 American
courts have adopted and expanded this common law privilege or immunity.
The privilege is absolute in the cases of legislators, 3 judges and other
participants in judicial proceedings, 4 and high ranking executive officers of
the federal, state, and local governments.5 The United States Supreme Court
has stated that the public interest in having the effective administration of
government uninhibited by the fear of damage suits in respect of official
statements generally justifies this absolute privilege.
6
Lower ranking public officers, on the other hand, are protected by only
a qualified privilege.7 This privilege will not protect a defendant whose
remarks were made maliciously. Once the privilege is raised, the defendant
will be called as a witness to deny malice on his part. The qualified privilege
thus subjects public officers claiming its protection to cross examination
upon their official conduct and requires that such conduct be submitted to
the judgment of a jury.
8
While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to permit the erosion of
common law privileges and immunities, 9 it has also recognized that fifth or
fourteenth amendment liberty interests 10 might be implicated when a public
1. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative & Executive Proceedings, 10
COLUM. L. REV. 131, 132 (1910).
2. See 50 Am. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 193-94 (1970).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
4. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV.
463 (1909).
5. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
6. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. at 498-99.
7. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.21 (1956); see also W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 783 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 783-84.
9. See notes 61-75 and accompanying text infra.
10. "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
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employee is discharged and official statements relating to the dismissal
result in stigma to the individual's reputation or deprivation of new employ-
ment opportunities. I I The Court has not determined who would prevail
when such a stigmatizing statement is made by an official whose remarks
are absolutely privileged. Clearly, full recognition of the common law
immunity of absolute privilege would sometimes result in an erosion of a
plaintiff's constitutionally protected liberty interests. The converse, how-
ever, is also true. Any diminution of the absolute privilege would be
inimical to freedom of expression and the uninhibited operations of govern-
ment it was created to protect.
Collisions between executive privilege and liberty interests, therefore,
pose difficult problems. Perhaps the most troublesome question is whether a
court is ever justified in subordinating the public officier's judicially
created, but firmly established, privilege to the fired employee's liberty
interest. The rapid proliferation of public employee liberty interest actions in
recent years 12 and the trend toward expanding the scope of absolute
privilege13 not only portend more frequent clashes between fifth and four-
teenth amendment liberty entitlements and the executive officer's privilege,
but also mandate an early resolution of this question.
This problem was drawn sharply into focus in Colaizzi v. Walker,
14
where the defendant Governor's public announcement of plaintiffs' dis-
charge contained serious charges of official misconduct. 15 The great weight
of authority recognizes that statements made by the highest executive officer
of a state are absolutely privileged, provided such statements bear some
relevance to his official duties. 16 On the other hand, the circumstances out of
which this litigation arose seem to fit squarely within the description of a
liberty interest infringement as articulated by the Supreme Court. "7
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was presented in
Colaizzi with an opportunity to consider whether the constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest must prevail over the common law absolute privilege,
law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law ..... Id. amend. XIV.
11. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
12. Roth, decided in 1972, was the first opinion recognizing discharge from public em-
ployment, coupled with stigma to the discharged employee's reputation, as an infringement of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. See notes 88, 90, 93, and % and accompanying text
infra.
13. See Comment, Defamation Immunity for Executive Officers, 20 CHI. L. REV. 677,679-
83 (1953).
14. 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1977) (No.
76-785).
15. 542 F.2d at 971.
16. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.23 (1956).
17. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 625-26 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347-48
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despite the policy considerations underlying the latter. With this question in
mind, this case comment will focus upon the reasoning of the appellate court
in an effort to determine to what extent this decision has aided in the
resolution of the problem. Absolute and qualified privileges will be ex-
amined, as will the effect of section 198318 of the Civil Rights Act upon
common law immunities. This article will also trace the development of a
body of case law relating to public employee liberty interests. The analysis
of the Colaizzi opinion will lead to the conclusion that the court failed to
take into consideration the policy underpinnings of the Illinois Governor's
common law absolute privilege in determining that plaintiffs had stated a
claim for deprivation of a protected liberty interest. As a result, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has shed little if any light on the issue of
whether a public officer's common law privilege might withstand a section
1983 attack for infringement of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
COLAIZZ V. WALKER
At the time of the incident which prompted this litigation, the named
plaintiff, Samuel Colaizzi, was Superintendent of the Division of Private
Employment Agencies of the Illinois Department of Labor and a second
plaintiff, Samuel Indovina, was an inspector in Colaizzi's division. Neither
plaintiff was tenured and no fourteenth amendment property interest in their
positions was claimed.19 Colaizzi and Indovina complained that Illinois
Governor Daniel Walker had discharged them from their official positions
and simultaneously issued or caused to be issued certain press releases.
20
The initial release announced their dismissal and stated that the Governor's
action was taken on the recommendation of Donald Page Moore, the Illinois
Director of Special Investigations. This press release went on to assert that
Colaizzi and Indovina had abused their official positions in an attempt to
force a company under their supervision to drop criminal proceedings
against an employee.2 The complaint stated that the charges in this and
other releases were made without notice or an opportunity to be heard and
alleged causes of action based on the fourteenth amendment 22 and sections
1981, 1983 and 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. 23 Pendent state claims for
defamation were also included.
24
(1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 89 infra.
19. 542 F.2d at 971-72.
20. Id. at 972.
21. Id. at 971.
22. Id. at 971-72.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1970).
24. 542 F.2d at 971-72.
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The trial court granted the motion of defendants Walker, Moore and
Staples25 to dismiss the complaint. The court ruled that as public officials
these defendants were protected by absolute privilege from liability for
monetary damages under section 1983 resulting from alleged defamatory
statements made in the course of their official duties. 26 The court also
concluded that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted 27 because it failed to allege a sufficient violation of plaintiffs' liberty
interests. Thereafter, the district court granted the motion of the remaining
defendants for judgment on the pleadings.
28
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the complaint
stated no cause of action based on sections 1981 and 1985 because no racial
or otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus was alleged.
29.
The appellate court also concurred with the lower court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' pendent state claim against Governor Walker and another defend-
ant for defamation, because of the Governor's absolute privilege and the
absolute immunity of public officials as to interofficial communications. 30
However, with respect to Donald Page Moore, who was alleged to have
repeated the charges in news conferences (thus going beyond interofficial
communications), the questions of whether he was entitled to either an
absolute or qualified privilege, and, if so entitled, whether his public
statements were matters of his official duties were remanded to the district
court.31
The Seventh Circuit identified as the principal issue the question of
whether plaintiffs were deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty
interest when Governor Walker issued the press releases without giving
them notice or an opportunity to be heard. 32 The court concluded that the
facts alleged stated a claim for relief under section 1983.
33
Before undertaking an analysis of the court's decision on what it
perceived to be the principal question, it will be necessary to review the
25. Lauri Staples was an employee in Moore's office.
26. Colaizzi v. Walker, No. 74 C 2130 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 19, 1974) (order granting motion to
dismiss complaint).
27. Id.
28. Colaizzi v. Walker, No. 74 C 2130 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 15, 1975) (order granting motion for
judgment on the pleadings).
29. 542 F.2d at 972.
30. Id. at 974.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 971, 972.
33. Id. at 972. With respect to the remaining issues, the court determined that the
allegation that the defamation was pursuant to a conspiracy between all defendants stated a
claim under section 1983 but added that a qualified, good faith defense might be available. Id. at
974. Finally, the court held that the district court could properly entertain the state law claims of
defamation against the two employees of the employment agency and against the agency itself.
Id.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 259
development and current state of the law with regard to the common law
immunities of absolute and qualified privilege of executive officers of
government, the impact of section 1983 upon common law immunities, and
the liberty interests of nontenured public employees.
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
The absolute privilege accorded certain public officers grew out of the
struggle between the British Crown and Parliament.34 The existence of such
a privilege had been at its inception considered necessary to prevent the
Crown from limiting freedom of speech and matters of deliberation in
Parliament. 35 The privilege quickly became a part of the English legal
heritage and followed parliamentary government in its progress throughout
the world. 36 In this country, freedom of legislative discussion was protected
by the Articles of Confederation37 and the immunity was later embodied in
the Constitution.38
In addition to being afforded to legislators, absolute immunity also
attached to defamatory matter published by any judge or judicial officer,
juror, witness, party, or counsel in the course of and with reference to any
judicial proceeding. 39 The only qualification imposed is that the statement
be somehow relevant to the case.' ° This immunity rests upon public policy
grounds and is designed to secure the complete independence of those
involved in the administration of justice.4
Under the same general policy rationale, the protection of absolute
immunity is also extended to certain executive officers of federal, state, and
in some jurisdictions, local governments.42 The leading American cases on
the subject of executive officers' privilege are Spalding v. Vilas4 3 and Barr
v. Matteo." In Spalding, the Supreme Court held that a statement made by
the Postmaster General was absolutely privileged, even if made malicious-
ly.45 Writing for an undivided Court, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that
34. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 781.
35. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative & Executive Proceedings, 10
COLUM. L. REV. 131, 131-32 (1910).
36. Id. at 131.
37. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, para. 5 provided that "[f]reedom of speech and
debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court, or place out of
Congress .. "
38. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. I states "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place."
39. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 777-79.
40. Id. at 778.
41. Id.
42. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative & Executive Proceedings, 10
COLUM. L. REV. 131, 140-46 (1910).
43. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
44. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
45. 161 U.S. at 498-99.
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[t]he head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits
of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become
the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously
cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as
entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were
subjected to any such restraint.4
Barr was a libel action against the Acting Director of the Office of
Rent Stabilization, an official of lower than cabinet rank. The action was
brought by subordinate officials of that office. Plaintiffs contended that
defendant's press release, announcing his intention to suspend them because
of the ,part which they had played in formulating a plan for utilization of
certain agency funds, had been actuated by malice .4 Concluding that the
principle announced in Spalding could not be restricted to executive officers
of cabinet rank, the Court held the statement absolutely privileged. The
majority reasoned that
[t]he complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have
become so great that there must of necessity be a delegation and
redelegation of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say
that these functions become less important simply because they
are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive
hierarchy. 8
In addition to these two United States Supreme Court cases, a number
of state courts have recognized the absolute immunity of a governor from
liability for defamatory statements made in connection with the performance
of his duties.4 9 In Ryan v. Wilson,1° the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
the Governor of that state was protected by an absolute privilege in a libel
action by a former assistant state attorney general. There, the Governor had
distributed to members of the press an investigative report containing a
statement that the plaintiff had collected a fee from a bank for legal services
rendered while he was on the state payroll. This statement was erroneous
and the Governor issued a retraction. Although determining that the defend-
ant's communication was absolutely privileged, the court held alternatively
that "if we are wrong in our conclusion that the privilege was absolute, it
was certainly a qualified privilege."- 51 The court thereupon held that the
Governor's widely publicized retraction was opposed to any malicious
intention and that the plaintiff had not carried his burden of proving actual
malice. 52
46. Id. at 498.
47. 360 U.S. at 568.
48. Id. at 573.
49. See notes 50-58 and accompanying text infra.
50. 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941).
51. Id. at 51, 300 N.W. at 716.
52. Id. at 51-52, 300 N.W. at 716.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Sciandra v. Lynett53 that
the Governor, in publishing a report of an alleged meeting of underworld
characters, enjoyed absolute immunity or privilege. 54 The court added that
the Governor would be immune from defamation actions even if the state-
ments contained false or inaccurate material and even if published with
malice and without reasonable or probable cause.
55
In Blair v. Walker,56 plaintiffs brought an action for libel against the
Governor of Illinois after the defendant had issued two allegedly libelous
press releases concerning them. The releases described plaintiffs as un-
scrupulous men and indicated that the Governor had initiated action to
revoke their real estate broker's licenses. The Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the defendant was protected from actions for civil defamation by an
absolute privilege when issuing statements legitimately related to matters
committed to his responsibility and that the Governor was acting within the
scope of this privilege when issuing the press releases relating to the
plaintiffs.5 7 While acknowledging that application of executive immunity
might occasionally deny relief to a deserving individual, the court con-
sidered the sacrifice justified "by the public's need for free and unfettered
action by its representatives. "58
It can be seen that allowing a public official to assert his privilege as an
impenetrable shield against all claims, regardless of merit, will almost
certainly close the courthouse doors to some deserving plaintiffs. It is hardly
surprising then that the privilege has generally been reserved for high
ranking officials only.
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
A qualified privilege attaches to good faith communications of lower
ranking public officials. 59 In order to invoke this privilege, the defendant
must establish that his communication was made on a proper occasion, for a
proper purpose, in a proper manner, and to proper parties.
60
Like the absolute privilege, this privilege is based on public policy
grounds. It has been stated that the privilege has its origin in, and is
governed by, the rules of good sense and customary conduct. 61 However,
53. 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963).
54. Id. at 599, 187 A.2d at 588.
55. Id.
56. 64 111. 2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 385 (1976).
57. Id. at 4, 349 N.E.2d at 389.
58. Id.
59. See Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746 (1966) (privilege
attaches to agency).
60. Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 I11. App. 2d 365, 150 N.E.2d 202 (1958).
61. 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 195 (1970).
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unlike the absolute privilege, which precludes any inquiry into the defend-
ant's motives, a defendant attempting to invoke the qualified privilege must
submit to a judicial inquiry to determine whether all of the above require-
ments have been met.
62
The qualified privilege will be lost if the defendant publishes the
defamation in the wrong state of mind. 63 Although it is often said that the
privilege is forfeited if the publication is malicious, 64 some commentators
consider malice an unsatisfactory term and state that the privilege will be
lost whenever the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of
furthering the interest which is entitled to protection, or published to accom-
plish an objective that is outside the scope of the privilege. 65 The privilege is
also lost if the defendant acts chiefly from motives of ill will, or if he does
not believe what he says.
66
The qualified privilege does not change the actionable quality of the
words published, but merely rebuts the inference of impropriety or malice
that is imputed in the absence of privilege. A showing that the privilege was
abused is then essential to the right of recovery. 67 Initially, the burden is on
the defendant to establish the existence of a privileged occasion for publish-
ing the defamatory matter and this is an issue of law for the court to
resolve.68 Once the defendant establishes the existence of the privilege, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that it has been abused, that is, that the
statement was made maliciously.69
Obviously, the public servant claiming a qualified privilege is in a
somewhat more precarious position than his superior who might be entitled
to an absolute privilege. Once the good faith requirement is met, however,
the effect on the defamed plaintiff is the same-he is left without a remedy.
THE EFFECT OF SECTION 1983 UPON COMMON LAW IMMUNITIES
Section 1983, originally enacted as section one of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,70 provides that every person who acts under color of state law to
deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in
damages. 71 Thus, section 1983 creates a class of tort liability which on its
62. Comment, Defamation Immunity for Executive Officers, 20 CHI. L. REV. 677, 679
(1953).
63. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 794.
64. Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (1974).
65. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 795.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 792.
68. Id. at 796.
69. Id.
70. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
71. See note 89 infra.
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face does not provide for any immunities. However, the section has not been
applied as stringently as it reads. 72 The implications of the literal sweep of
section 1983 were first considered in Tenney v. Brandhove.73 There it was
claimed that members of a California legislative committee had summoned
the plaintiff to appear before them not for a proper legislative purpose, but
rather to intimidate him into silence on certain matters of public concern,
thereby depriving him of his constitutional rights.74 Because state legislators
had enjoyed absolute immunity for their official actions, Tenney squarely
presented the question of whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended
to restrict the availability in section 1983 cases of those immunities which
historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded various
categories of officials. The Court concluded that immunities "well ground-
ed in history and reason" had not been abrogated by covert inclusion in the
general language of section 1983.
75
The Supreme Court also has had occasion to consider the section 1983
liability of several types of government officials other than legislators. 76 In
Pierson v. Ray,77 the Court found a Mississippi judge immune from liability
for damages for his role in the unconstitutional convictions of clergymen
who had attempted to integrate a bus terminal waiting room. Observing that
the immunity would apply even where the judge was accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, the Court nevertheless determined that this im-
munity was not abolished by section 1983.78 In the same opinion, the Court
also held that the common law qualified privilege of a policeman to make a
good faith arrest upon probable cause was available in an action brought
under section 1983.
79
In Imbler v. Pachtman,8 the petitioner sought damages for loss of
liberty allegedly caused by unlawful prosecution, alleging that the respond-
ent, a state prosecuting attorney, had knowingly used false testimony and
suppressed material evidence at petitioner's trial. The Court held that a
prosecuting attorney who acts within the scope of his duties is absolutely
immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983 because to deny
him the privilege would deter him from properly discharging the duties of
his office.
81
72. See notes 73-81 and accompanying text infra.
73. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
74. Id. at 371.
75. Id. at 376.
76. See notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra.
77. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
78. Id. at 553-54.
79. Id. at 555-57.
80. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
81. Id. at 427-28.
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A more troublesome question of absolute privilege was presented in
Scheuer v. Rhodes.82 There the personal representatives of the estates of
students who were killed on the campus of a state controlled university
brought damages actions under section 1983 against the Governor of Ohio,
the university president, and the Adjutant General, various officers, and
enlisted men of the Ohio National Guard. Plaintiffs charged that these
defendants, acting under color of state law, had caused an unnecessary
national guard deployment on the university campus and ordered the
guardsmen to perform allegedly illegal acts, resulting in the students'
deaths. Defendants answered that their acts were absolutely privileged.
Thus, the Court considered the narrow issue of "whether there is an
absolute immunity, as the Court of Appeals determined, governing the
specific allegations of the complaint against the chief executive officer of a
State, the senior and subordinate officers and enlisted personnel of that
State's National Guard, and the president of a state controlled university." 83
The Supreme Court held that the immunity of officers of the executive
branch of a state government for their acts is not absolute but qualified and
of varying degree, depending upon the scope of discretion and respon-
sibilities of the particular officer and upon the circumstances existing at the
time the challenged action was taken.
84
In Scheuer, the Supreme Court seemed to conclude that, in the United
States, members of the executive branch had never been absolutely immune
from liability for damages resulting from their official acts. Although some
federal circuit courts have recognized such absolute immunity,85 these
opinions are not mentioned in Scheuer. After concluding that only a qual-
ified privilege existed where official acts are complained of, the Court
underscored its conclusion by illustrating the dangers which might result
from permitting such an absolute privilege to defeat a section 1983 action.
Noting that section 1983 was intended to give a remedy to parties deprived
of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of
his position, the Court pointed out that section 1983 would be drained of all
meaning if it were to hold that the acts of a Governor or other high executive
officer have the "quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding
all conflicting rights, and unreviewable through the judicial power of the
federal government."86
The question of the effect of section 1983 on the common law immuni-
ty of an executive officer against defamation actions remains unanswered.
82. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
83. Id. at 242.
84. Id. at 247-50.
85. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
86. 416 U.S. at 248.
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However, Tenney, Pierson, Imbler, and Scheuer are enlightening as to the
reasoning the Court would employ in resolving this issue. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that section 1983 was not intended to abolish every
common law tort immunity.87 On the other hand, Scheuer demonstrates that
where a plaintiff complains of grave harm as a result of an official's acts, a
claim of privilege will not be permitted to defeat the complaint without an
inquiry as to that official's good faith. These cases illustrate that each
common law immunity will be considered separately and that in each case
the Court will balance the policy underpinnings of that immunity against the
purpose of section 1983. The factors to be considered would be the amount
of discretion necessary for the official to properly perform his duties, the
likelihood of nuisance lawsuits, the chilling effect of eroding the privilege,
the public interest in providing a remedy for every wrong, and the gravity of
potential harm for which no redress would be available were a privilege,
particularly an absolute privilege, to be recognized.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' LIBERTY INTERESTS
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
prohibit deprivation by the federal or state governments of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.88 Direct actions against state officials
for deprivation of constitutional rights are made possible by section 1983.89
The courts have not hesitated to find an impermissible infringement of
a protected property interest when a tenured public employee is dismissed
without notice and a hearing. 9° However, the plight of the nontenured
government employee who is summarily discharged has evoked scant sym-
pathy from the courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court. A long
line of Supreme Court decisions supports the general proposition that public
employers have virtual carte blanche authority to dismiss nontenured em-
ployees without notice, a hearing, or even a statement of the reasons for the
discharge. 91 Although a public employee generally cannot assert a property
interest in his position in the absence of a contractual or de facto tenure
system, 92 recent Supreme Court decisions have described, by way of dicta,
87. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
88. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.
89. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
90. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-602 (1972).
91. Id. at 599. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-46 (1976).
92. 408 U.S. at 599.
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situations in which a fired public employee, even though nontenured, might
prevail on a theory of infringement of a protected liberty interest.
93
Supreme Court Decisions
The first such opinion was Board of Regents v. Roth,94 a case involv-
ing a nontenured state university teacher who was informed without expla-
nation that he would not be rehired for the ensuing academic year. Although
concluding that Roth had been deprived of neither a property nor a liberty
interest, the Court stated that "[tihere might be cases in which a State
refused to re-employ a person under such circumstances that interests in
liberty might be implicated." 95 Noting that the state, in declining to rehire
Roth, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his
standing and associations in his community, the Court stated that if such a
charge had been made, due process entitlements would have attached and
Roth would have been entitled to a hearing to refute it. 96 This hearing
appears to be required by Wisconsin v. Constantineau ,97 which dictated that
notice and an opportunity to be- heard are essential where a person's good
name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of "what the
government is doing to him. "98 Roth would also have been entitled to a
hearing, the Court added, had the state imposed a stigma or disability which
could have foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities.
99
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem to reflect some
narrowing of the sweeping dicta of Constantineau and Roth relating to
liberty interests. In Paul v. Davis,l10 the Court held that the plaintiff had not
been deprived of a liberty or property interest when his photograph and
name appeared on a flyer of "active shoplifters" distributed by police to
merchants. 10 1 More specifically, the Court held that reputation alone, apart
from some other, more tangible interest such as employment, did not
implicate any liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke the procedural
protection of the due process clause. 1°2 Hence, to establish a claim under
section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment, more must be involved than
simple defamation by a state official.1
03
93. See notes 94-111 and accompanying text infra.
94. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
95. Id. at 573.
96. Id.
97. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
98. Id. at 437.
99. 408 U.S. at 573.
100. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
101. Id. at 694.
102. Id. at 712.
103. Id. at 702, 712.
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In Bishop v. Wood, 1°4 the "more tangible interest such as employ-
ment" requirement seemed to have been fulfilled. Bishop involved an
action brought by a former police officer who contended that his discharge
from his job, coupled with charges that he failed to follow orders, seldom
attended police training classes, induced low morale among his fellow
officers, and engaged in conduct unsuited to an officer amounted to a
deprivation of a liberty interest because he had not been afforded a pretermi-
nation hearing." 5 The Court determined, however, that the plaintiff had
suffered no deprivation of an interest in liberty protected by the due process
clause because the reason for his discharge, even if false, was given to him
in private and because there was no public disclosure of the reasons. 106 The
Court was not troubled by the disclosure made in answers to interrogatories
after the litigation commenced because "plaintiff had suffered the injury for
which he [sought] redress."'
107
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, Codd v. Vel-
ger,!0 8 also involved a fired police officer. In Codd, the complaint alleged
that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing due to the stigmatizing effect of
certain material placed in his file by the New York City Police Depart-
ment. 1°9 The Supreme Court held that plaintiff had failed to allege one
essential element of his case, namely, that the stigmatizing information
contained in the personal file was false.110 The Court pointed out that the
sole purpose of the hearing demanded by plaintiff was to provide him an
opportunity to clear his name, and concluded that no hearing could achieve
this result unless the plaintiff challenged the substantial truth of the material
in question. I I
Thus, despite the dicta in Roth and its progeny to the effect that
discharge from public employment plus stigma equals a deprivation of a
liberty interest so as to invoke procedural due process safeguards, no
plaintiff before the Supreme Court has yet prevailed on this theory. Such
plaintiffs have fared better in the lower federal courts but the ambivalence
apparent in the brief Roth line of Supreme Court decisions has led to various
104. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
105. Id. at 342-44.
106. Id. at 348.
107. Id. at 348-49. The Bishop decision is troubling in at least one respect. It raises the
specter of an individual being denied future employment because of the reasons given for
termination of his prior employment, even though those reasons might have been false. It seems
that when a plaintiff alleges that the reasons given for his dismissal were untrue, he should at
least be able to make out a section 1983 claim for injunctive relief to prevent disclosure of the
false information to potential employers. See id. at 352-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
109. Id. at 625.
110. Id. at 626-27.
11. Id. at 627.
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pronouncements by district and appellate courts. The opinions of these
lower courts reflect some disagreement as to the types of statements suffi-
cient to trigger procedural due process safeguards. Some jurisdictions have
focused primarily or exclusively upon plaintiff's opportunity to gain new
employment," 2 while others have ignored this consideration and have
concentrated instead upon the effect of the statement complained of upon the
plaintiff's standing and associations in his community. "13
Circuit Court Decisions
A literal reading of Roth suggests that potential harm to both general
and professional reputation should be evaluated."I4 This is the approach
generally taken by the Second and Fifth Circuits. Decisions by these circuit
courts almost invariably contain discussions of the impact of the charges
which gave rise to the dismissal upon the plaintiff's reputation in his
community and upon his prospects for gaining future employment." 15
The Sixth Circuit has focused on the stigmatizing effect upon the
former employee's good name, holding that in order for charges leveled
against a public employee to constitute a deprivation of liberty within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment, those charges must be of such nature
as to damage seriously his standing and associations in his community."
6
With respect to future employment, the Sixth Circuit places upon liberty
interest plaintiffs the formidable burden of proving a negative, that is, to
show "[t]hat a definite range of opportunities is no longer open to them." 117
112. See note 122 and accompanying text infra.
113. See notes 116-122 and accompanying text infra.
114. See 408 U.S. at 573-74. This portion of the opinion discusses both general and
professional reputation:
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against
him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It
did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had
been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different
case ....
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ
the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. The State, for
example, did not invoke any regulations to bar the respondent from all other public
employment in state universities. Had it done so, this, again, would be a different
case.
115. See, e.g., Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds
sub nor. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's University, 509
F.2d 133, 137 (5th Cir. 1975).
116. See Lake Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College,
518 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279
(6th Cir. 1976). Because the plaintiff in Sullivan had not been discharged, but merely reassigned
to another school, the liberty interest' claim was considered closed by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
117. See Lake Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College,
518 F.2d 1091, 1099 (6th Cir. 1975).
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The Ninth Circuit has also directed its inquiry to the impact outside of
professional life. 118 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated
in Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital1 19 that "[liberty is not in-
fringed by a label of incompetence, the repercussions of which primarily
affect professional life, and which may well force the individual down one
or more notches in the professional hierarchy."' 120 The court made it clear
that it would not consider anything short of a permanent exclusion from, or
protracted interruption of, gainful employment within the trade or profes-
sion a sufficient taking of liberty so as to invoke procedural due process
safeguards. In other words, no constitutional need for procedural protection
would be recognized when the likely results of a false charge are reduced
economic returns and diminished prestige within the profession. '
2'
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has
given more attention to the question of whether the defendant's statements
adversely affected plaintiff's future employment opportunities. 22 In recent
years, the Eighth Circuit has entertained more liberty interest cases than the
other circuits. This is not surprising in light of that jurisdiction's emphasis
upon a plaintiff's professional reputation. Some damage to a plaintiff's
professional reputation might be presumed merely from the fact that he was
fired and any statement of the reasons for the dismissal would further
decrease his chances of finding a new position. Thus, the liberty interest has
been given added context in the Eighth Circuit.
Few liberty interest cases have been decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit and few general statements can be made concerning
that court's methodology in such cases. The court has read Roth as articulat-
ing a two-tiered test which requires determinations of (1) whether plaintiff's
good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake, and if not, (2) whether
the freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities has been
foreclosed. 23 However, the court has not always analyzed these interests
separately. 
124
The Seventh Circuit's decisions do indicate that it would require a
rather serious allegation of misconduct before a liberty interest claim would
be stated. This is particularly apparent in the holding in Adams v. Wal-
118. See note 119 and accompanying text infra.
119. 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
120. Id. at 366.
121. Id.
122. See generally Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976); Greenhill
v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir. 1975). Cf. Brouillette v. Board of Directors, 519 F.2d 126, 127-
28 (8th Cir. 1975) (allegations of teacher's inadequacy found to be minor and not determinative).
123. See Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
124. See discussion of Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973) in Adams v. Walker,
492 F.2d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 1974).
270 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ker, 125 a case in which the facts were similar to those in Colaizzi. There the
Governor removed Adams, the Chairman of the State Liquor Control Board,
and advised him of this fact by sending him a telegram indicating that the
removal was based upon Adams' "incompetence, neglect of duty, or mal-
feasance in office."' 126 The court held that there had been no taking of
liberty without due process of law because the charges were not of such
magnitude as to stain plaintiff's reputation or bar his future employment. 127
It was reasoned that the charge of "incompetence, neglect of duty and
malfeasance in office" is less stigmatizing because that is the language
contained in that portion of the Illinois Constitution which authorizes the
Governor to dismiss appointees.
128
These opinions emphasize the disparate results various jurisdictions
might reach in public employee liberty interest actions, even though similar
fact patterns might be presented. A plaintiff's chance of success could
depend not upon whether he has been harmed but rather upon the serious-
ness of the harm. Once serious harm is shown, the outcome might still turn
on whether the damage is to the plaintiff's general or professional reputa-
tion.
ANALYSIS OF THE COLAIZZI OPINION
In reversing the decision of the district court, the court of appeals stated
as the principal issue the question of "whether defendant Walker's asser-
tions in a press release, that plaintiffs abused their official positions in
attempting to force a company under their supervision to drop criminal
charges against an employee, deprived plaintiffs of a liberty interest protect-
ed by the fourteenth amendment.1 ' 29 The question was then resolved in
rather mechanical fashion. Since the charges contained in the press release
charged sufficiently reprehensible conduct so as to impugn the good names
of plaintiffs, and since the stigmatizing statement was accompanied by a
discharge from employment, a section 1983 claim for deprivation of liberty
without due process had been stated.130
It cannot be denied that the deprivation of liberty question was indeed
an important one. It seems, however, that an equally important issue was
whether the Governor's absolute immunity was available in an action
brought under section 1983. This question was not addressed by the court
125. 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
126. Id. at 1004 (quoting telegram).
127. Id. at 1007-08.
128. Id. at 1008.
129. 542 F.2d at 971.
130. Id. at 972.
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and no reason was given for its omission. The defendant's absolute privilege
was the primary reason for the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's com-
plaint as it related to Walker, Moore, and Staples.' 31 It was also the first
issue argued in plaintiffs' appellate brief. 132 Defendants' brief contained no
discussion of the issue, perhaps because they accepted plaintiffs' contention
that, in light of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 133 Walker was entitled to only a
qualified privilege.
This contention should not have been so readily accepted because the
issues considered in Scheuer were very narrow and because the defendants
in Scheuer were attempting to invoke an altogether different common law
immunity. It might be argued that greater harm could result from allowing
high officials to act with impunity than from permitting them to assert
absolute privilege against damage suits for defamation. The Colaizzi and
Scheuer cases illustrate this point. In Colaizzi, the plaintiffs complained of
injury to their reputations. In Scheuer, Governor Rhodes of Ohio attempted
to assert absolute executive privilege as a bar to claims arising out of the
deaths of college students killed by Ohio national guardsmen.
One troublesome aspect of the holding in Colaizzi is that officials such
as former Governor Walker can easily avoid section 1983 liability by simply
refusing to comment on the reasons why an employee is fired or to maintain
any record of those reasons so as to insure against future disclosures.
Without the stigmatizing statement, one element of the plaintiff's cause of
action is eliminated. The performance of public employees should, it seems,
be subject to public scrutiny. 134 However, secrecy in connection with public
employee dismissals seems to be the most predictable, and perhaps the most
undesirable, result of Colaizzi.
The doctrine of absolute privilege represents a drastic resolution of the
conflict between the public interest and the individual's right to be secure in
his reputation. Certainly it represents an exception to the maxim that "for
every wrong there is a remedy." Perhaps the result in Colaizzi can be
justified but the Seventh Circuit failed to do so in its opinion. The opinion
was not supported by adequate reasoning, and because of this the decision
clouds rather than clarifies the question of the effect of section 1983 upon
131. Colaizzi v. Walker, No. 74 C 2130 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 19, 1974). The order granting the
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint states: "[T]he court finds that these public officials
are protected by the absolute immunity enunciated in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) from
liability for monetary damages under section 1983 for the allegedly defamatory statements
made in the course of their official duties ....
132. Brief for Appellant at 1, Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d %9 (7th Cir. 1976).
133. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
134. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-84 (1964), and Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (criticism of public officials entitled to first amendment
protection).
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the common law privilege. This question should have been addressed and
could have been resolved by balancing the countervailing considerations.
The purpose of section 1983 and the individual's interest in being free to
seek new employment with his reputation untarnished by unwarranted
charges should have been weighed against the public interest in shielding
responsible governmental officers from the harassment and hazards of
vindictive or ill-founded damage suits.
Assuming that the privilege should not be abrogated by section 1983, a
plaintiff could not recover unless he alleged that the stigmatizing charges
were not within the scope of the official's duties. Plaintiffs harmed by
statements falling outside the scope of official duties would be able to
maintain a state law action for defamation but could expect to encounter
more difficulty in a liberty interest suit brought under section 1983. A
liberty interest plaintiff would have to contend on the one hand that the
officer's statements were not made within the scope of official duties and on
the other that the statements were made under color of state law. These
contentions are not necessarily mutually exclusive because a defendant's
remarks could fall outside the scope of his official duties but still amount to
a deprivation of one's liberty through-the official's abuse of his position.
This is the very evil that section 1983 was intended to correct.' 35
Unfortunately, each alternative in this balancing process has its inher-
ent evils. If the privilege is recognized, some wrongs might remain unre-
dressed, and if not, a well-meaning public officer might be subjected to
retaliatory lawsuits. Former Illinois Governor Walker, for example, has on
three occasions been sued because of allegedly defamatory statements made
while discharging the duties of his office.' 36 Such litigation consumes time
and energy which could otherwise be devoted to the administration of
government. Colaizzi alone has been in the courts for approximately three
years. 1
37
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Spalding v. Vilas l38 and Barr
v. Matteo139 seems no less valid today than when the cases were decided. It
appears, therefore, that the absolute immunity of the highest executive
officer and those of cabinet or equivalent rank should be recognized in the
context of a section 1983 action: With respect to officials of lesser rank,
however, the need for an absolute privilege is less apparent. Most subordi-
nate officials have a primary obligation to answer to their superiors, rather
135. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
136. In addition to this action, Governor Walker was the defendant in Adams v. Walker,
492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974), and Blair v. Walker, 64 I!1. 2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 385 (1976).
137. The complaint in Colaizzi was filed on July 29, 1974.
138. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
139. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 273
than to the public at large, and interofficial communications are probably
absolutely privileged. 14 Finally, the large number of persons in government
who could be classified as "lower ranking executive officers" dictates
against a hard and fast rule of absolute immunity for all.
Where lower ranking officers seek to assert an absolute privilege, a
similar balancing test should be applied but with some additional considera-
tions placed on the scales. In order to determine whether the defendant's
privilege should be absolute or qualified, the court should seek answers to
the following questions: (1) Are public announcements of employee dismis-
sals generally made by someone other than this official? (2) If not, is the
allegedly stigmatizing statement one which would be defamatory on its face
(libel per se or slander actionable without proof of damages)?14 1 (3) Does
the defendant have significantly greater access to media outlets than the
plaintiff? (Would the plaintiff's rebuttal be as widely disseminated as the
defendant's statements?) (4) Does the statement substantially diminish
plaintiff's ability to gain new employment? If the answer to any of these
questions is in the affirmative, or if the scales otherwise tip in plaintiff's
favor (for instance, if the facts reveal wider dissemination of the defamatory
matter than appears necessary or an apparent lack of basis for the charges),
the defendant should be called upon to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a
jury that his remarks were made in good faith. 142
A petition for certiorari was filed in the Colaizzi case but review was
denied.143 It seems clear that the decision to abandon the absolute privilege
argument at the appellate court level was an improvident one. Walker has
now been found amenable to suit for infringement of plaintiff's liberty
interests, but the question of his absolute immunity from such suits has not
even been considered. It is now too late for former Governor Walker to
assert the privilege as the basis for a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss'" but
he still might affirmatively plead the privilege in his answer to plaintiffs'
complaint. 45 If the question is once again presented, Colaizzi might eventu-
ally wend its way back to the United States Supreme Court for a definitive
ruling on the status of this absolute privilege in the context of a section 1983
action. With this question of first impression included, the case would be
more likely to gain review than in its present posture. Since recent Supreme
140. At common law, such communications are absolutely privileged. See note 30 and
accompanying text supra. The status of this privilege in the context of a section 1983 action is
undetermined.
141. See PROSSER, supra note 7, at 745-60, 762-63.
.142. The burden of proving that the remarks were not made in good faith would be upon
the plaintiff.
143. 45 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1977) (No. 76-785).
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
145. See 5 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§ 1505, 1506 (3d ed. 1968).
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Court decisions have favored perpetuation of common law immunities, even
when subjected to a section 1983 attack, the Court would be likely to
recognize Walker's privilege as a bar to plaintiffs' liberty interest claims.
CONCLUSION
In Colaizzi, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that discharge of a public employee, coupled with a statement of the reasons
for the dismissal which could injure the former employee's reputation,
amounts to a taking of liberty without procedural due process. In this
respect, Colaizzi tracks earlier United States Supreme Court decisions.
However, Colaizzi contains an added ingredient which has never been
considered by the Supreme Court and which, unfortunately, was not con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The statement
complained of in Colaizzi was made by an official protected at common law
from liability for defamatory remarks. In permitting the section 1983 claim
to override the common law immunity, the court failed to weigh the
countervailing interests or to consider Supreme Court opinions which evince
a preference for allowing such immunities.
JAMES 0. VAUGHN
